Abstract. Consider a network vulnerable to viral infection. The system security software can guarantee safety only to a limited part of the network. We model this practical network scenario as a non-cooperative multi-player game on a graph, with two kinds of players, a set of attackers and a protector player, representing the viruses and the system security software, respectively. Each attacker player chooses a node of the graph (or a set of them, via a probability distribution) to infect. The protector player chooses independently, in a basic case of the problem, a simple path or an edge of the graph (or a set of them, via a probability distribution) and cleans this part of the network from attackers. Each attacker wishes to maximize the probability of escaping its cleaning by the protector. In contrast, the protector aims at maximizing the expected number of cleaned attackers. We call the two games obtained from the two basic cases considered, as the Path and the Edge model, respectively. We are interested in the associated Nash equilibria on them, where no network entity can unilaterally improve its local objective. We obtain the following results:
Introduction
Motivation. This work considers a problem of Network Security, related to the protection of a system from harmful procedures (e.g. viruses, worms). Consider an information network where the nodes of the network are insecure and vulnerable to infection such as, viruses, Trojan horses, the attackers. A protector, i.e. system security software, is available in the system but it can guarantees security only to a limited part of the network, such as a simple path or a single link of it, chosen via a probability distribution. Each harmful entity targets a location (i.e. a node) of the network via a probability distribution; the node is damaged unless it is cleaned by the system security software. Apparently, the harmful entities and the system security software have conflicting objectives. The security software seeks to protect the network as much as possible, while the harmful entities wish to avoid being caught by the software so that they be able to damage the network. Thus, the system security software seeks to maximize the expected number of viruses it catches, while each harmful entity seeks to maximize the probability it escapes from the security software. Naturally, we model this scenario as a non-cooperative multi-player strategic game played on a graph with two kinds of players: the vertex players representing the harmful entities, and the edge or the path player representing each one of the above two cases for the system security software considered; where it chooses a simple path or a single edge, respectively. The corresponding games are called the Path and the Edge model, respectively. In both cases, the Individual Cost of each player is the quantity to be maximized by the corresponding entity. We are interested in the Nash equilibria [7, 8] associated with these games, where no player can unilaterally improve its Individual Cost by switching to a more advantageous probability distribution.
Summary of Results. Our results are summarized as follows:
-We prove that the problem of existence of pure Nash equilibria in the Path model is N P-complete (Theorem 1). This opposes to that, the simpler case of this model, i.e. that the Edge model posses no pure Nash equilibrium [4] . - [4] provides a graph-theoretic characterization of mixed Nash Equilibria for the Edge model. Unfortunately, this characterization only implies an exponential time algorithm for the general case. Here, we utilize the characterization in order to compute, in polynomial time, mixed Nash equilibria for specific graph instances of the game. In particular, we combine the characterization with a suitable exploration of some graph-theoretic properties of each graph family considered to obtain polynomial time mixed Nash equilibria. These graph families include, regular graphs, graphs that can be partitioned into vertex disjoint regular subgraphs, graphs with perfect matchings and trees (Theorem 3, Proposition 2, Theorems 4 and 5, respectively). -We measure the system performance with respect to the problem considered utilizing the notion of the social cost [3] . Here, it is defined to be the number of attackers catch by the protector. We compute upper and lower bounds of the social cost in any mixed Nash equilibria of the Edge model. Using these bounds, we show that the corresponding Price of Anarchy is upper and lower bounded by a linear function of the number of vertices of the graph (Theorem 6).
Due to space limits, some proofs are omitted; we include them in the full version of the paper [5] .
Related Work and Significance. This work is a step further in the development of the new born area of Algorithmic Game Theory. It is also one of the only few works to model network security problems as a strategic game. Such a research line is that of Interdependent Security games, e.g. [2] . However, we remark that none of these works, with an exception of [2] , study Nash equilibria on the games considered. This work is also one of the only few works that study games exploiting heavily Graph-Theoretic tools. In [2] , the authors study a security problem and establish connections with variants of the Graph Partition problem.
In [1] , the authors study a two-players game on a graph, establish connections with the k-server problem. In a recent work of ours [4] , we consider the simpler of the two games considered here, the Edge model. We provide a non-existence result for pure Nash equilibria of the model and a polynomial time algorithm for mixed Nash equilibria for bipartite graphs. Finally, our results contribute toward answering the general question of Papadimitriou [10] about the complexity of Nash equilibria for our special game.
Framework
Throughout, we consider an undirected graph G(V, E), with |V (G)| = n and |E(G)| = m. Given a set of vertices X ⊆ V , the graph G\X is obtained by removing from G all vertices of X and their incident edges. For any vertex v ∈ V (G), denote ∆(v) the degree of vertex v in G. Denote ∆(G) the maximum degree of the graph G. A simple path, P , of G is a path of G with no repeated vertices, i.e.
and each v i ∈ V appears at most once in P . Denote P(G) the set of all possible simple paths in G. For a tree graph T denote root ∈ V , the root of the tree and leaves(T ) the leaves of the tree T . For any v ∈ V (T ), denote parent(v), the parent of v in the tree and children(v) its children in the tree T . For any
2.1 Protector-Attacker models Definition 1. An information network is represented as an undirected graph G(V, E). The vertices represent the network hosts and the edges represent the communication links. For M = {P, E}, we define a non-cooperative game Π M = N , {S i } i∈N , {IC} i∈N as follows:
-The set of players is N = N vp ∪ N p , where N vp is a finite set of vertex players vp i , i ≥ 1, p = {pp, ep} and N p is a singleton set of a player p which is either (i) a path player and p = pp or (ii) an edge player and p = ep, in the case where M = P or M = E, respectively. -The strategy set S i of each player vp i , i ∈ N vp , is V ; the strategy set S p of the player p is either (i) the set of paths of G, P(G) or (i) E, when M = P or M = E, respectively. Thus, the strategy set S of the game is
-Take any strategy profile s = s 1 , . . . , s |Nvp| , s p ∈ S, called a configuration.
• The Individual Cost of vertex player vp i is a function
We call the games obtained as the Path or the Edge model, for the case where
The configuration s is a pure Nash equilibrium [7, 8] (abbreviated as pure NE) if for each player i ∈ N , it minimizes IC i over all configurations t that differ from s only with respect to the strategy of player i. We consider mixed strategies for the Edge model. In the rest of the paper, unless explicitly mentioned, when referring to mixed strategies, these apply on the Edge model. A mixed strategy for a vertex player (resp., edge player) is a probability distribution over vertices (resp., over edges) of G. A mixed strategy profile s is a collection of mixed strategies, one for each player. Denote P s (ep, e) the probability that edge player ep chooses edge e ∈ E(G) in s; denote P s (vp i , v) the probability that player vp i chooses vertex v ∈ V in s. Denote P s (vp, v) = i∈Nvp P s (vp i , v) the probability that vertex v is chosen by some vertex player in s. The support of a player i ∈ N in the configuration s, denoted D s (i), is the set of pure strategies in its strategy set to which i assigns strictly positive probability in s.
Given a mixed strategy profile s, we denote (s −x , [y]) a configuration obtained by s, where all but player x play as in s and player x plays the pure strategy y. A mixed strategic profile s induces an Expected Individual Cost IC i for each player i ∈ N , which is the expectation, according to s, of its corresponding Individual Cost (defined previously for pure strategy profiles). The mixed strategy profile, denoted as s * , is a mixed Nash equilibrium [7, 8] (abbreviated as mixed NE) if for each player i ∈ N , it maximizes IC i over all configurations t that differ from s only with respect to the mixed strategy of player i. Denote BR s (x) the set of best response (pure) strategies of player x in a mixed strategy profile s, that is, IC x (s −x , y) ≥ IC x (s −x , y ′ ), ∀ y ∈ BR s (x) and y ′ ∈ BR s (x), y ′ ∈ S x , where S x is the strategy set of player x (see also [9, chapter 3] ). A fully mixed strategy profile is one in which each player plays with positive probability all strategies of its strategy set.
For the rest of this section, fix a mixed strategy profile s. For each vertex v ∈ V , denote Hit(v) the event that the edge player hits vertex v. So, P s (Hit(v)) = e∈EN eigh(v) P s (ep, e). Define the minimum hitting probability P s as min v P s (Hit(v) ). For each vertex v ∈ V , denote m s (v) the expected number of vertex players choosing v (according to s). For each edge e = (u, v) ∈ E, denote m s (e) the expected number of vertex players choosing either u or v; so, m s (e) = m s (u) + m s (v). It is easy to see that for each vertex v ∈ V , m s (v) = i∈Nvp P s (vp i , v). Define the maximum expected number of vertex players choosing e in s as max e m s (e). We proceed to calculate the Expected Individual Costs for any vertex player vp i ∈ N vp and for the edge player.
(1)
Social Cost and Price of Anarchy. We utilize the notion of social cost [3] for evaluating the system performance. 
Background from Graph Theory
Throughout this work, we consider the (undirected) graph G = G(V, E).
Definition 4.
A graph G is polynomially computable r-factor graph if its vertices can be partitioned, in polynomial time, into a sequence
A hamiltonian path of a graph G is a simple path containing all vertices of G. A set M ⊆ E is a matching of G if no two edges in M share a vertex. A vertex cover of G is a set V ′ ⊆ V such that for every edge (u, v) ∈ E either u ∈ V ′ or v ∈ V ′ . An edge cover of G is a set E ′ ⊆ E such that for every vertex v ∈ V , there is an edge (v, u) ∈ E ′ .
A matching M of G that is also an edge cover of the graph is called perfect matching. Say that an edge (u, v) ∈ E (resp., a vertex v ∈ V ) is covered by the vertex cover V ′ (resp., the edge cover E ′ ) if either u ∈ V ′ or v ∈ V ′ (resp., if there is an edge (u, v) ∈ E ′ ). A set IS ⊆ V is an independent set of G if for all vertices u, v ∈ IS, (u, v) / ∈ E. A two-factor graph is a polynomially computable r-factor graph with r = 2. It can be easily seen that there exist exponential many such graph instances. Moreover, these graphs can be recognized in polynomial time and decomposed into a sequence C 1 , . . . , C k , k ≤ n, in polynomial time via Tutte's reduction [11] . Thus, the class of polynomially computable r-factor graphs contains an exponential number of graph instances. The problem of finding a maximum matching of any graph can be solved in polynomial time [6] .
Nash Equilibria in the Path Model
We characterize pure Nash Equilibria of the Path model. Proof. Assume that G contains a hamiltonian path. Then, consider any configuration s of Π P (G) in which the path player pp selects such a path. Observe that path's player selection includes all vertices of G, that the player is satisfied in s. Moreover, any player vp i , i ∈ N vp cannot increase its individual cost since, for all v ∈ V (G), v is caught by pp and, consequently,
For the contrary, assume that Π P (G), contains a pure NE, s * , but the graph G does not contain a hamiltonian path. Then, the strategy of the path player, s * pp , is not a hamiltonian path of G. Thus, there must exist a set of vertices U ⊆ V such that, for any u ∈ U , u ∈ s * pp . Since s * is a NE, for all players vp i , i ∈ N vp , it must be that s * i ∈ U . Therefore, there is no vertex player located on path s * pp which implies that pp is not satisfied in s * ; it could increase its individual cost by selecting any path containing at least one vertex player. Thus s * is not a NE, which gives a contradiction. ⊓ ⊔ Corollary 1. The problem of deciding whether there exists a pure NE for any Π P (G) is N P-complete.
Nash Equilibria in the Edge Model
We proceed to study Nash equilibria in the Edge model. In [4, Theorem 1] it was proved that if G contains more than one edges, then Π E (G) has no pure Nash Equilibrium. For mixed NE, it was proved that:
Theorem 2 (Characterization of Mixed NE). [4] A mixed strategy profile s is a Nash equilibrium for any Π(G) if and only if:
Here, we provide a estimation on the payoffs of the vertex players in any Nash equilibrium.
Mixed Nash Equilibria in Various Graphs
Regular, Polynomially Computable r-factor and Two-factor graphs Theorem 3. For any Π E (G) for which G is an r-regular graph, a mixed NE can be computed in constant time O(1).
Proof. Construct the following configuration s r on Π E (G):
For any i ∈ N vp , P s r (vp i , v) := 
The above result combined with the fact that D s r (vp i ) = V = S i , concludes that any vp i is satisfied in s r . Now consider the edge player; for any e = (u, v), e ′ = (u ′ , v ′ ) ∈ E, by eq. (2) 
The above result combined with the fact that D s r (ep) = E = S ep , concludes that ep is also satisfied in s r and henceforth s r is a mixed NE of Π E (G). It can be easily seen that the time complexity of the assignment O(1).
⊓ ⊔
